JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AS A SPECIAL FORM OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION OF THE MODERN STATE: GENESIS, BASIC MODELS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.34015/2523-4552.2019.2.02Keywords:
constitution, judicial protection, human rights, rule of lawAbstract
The article investigates the place of judicial protection of the constitution as a special form of human rights protection of the modern state. The stages of the evolution of judicial constitutional control and the features of its main models are revealed. It is concluded that the development of a centralized system of judicial protection of the constitution (the Cel'zen model) is a leading trend in this sphere and one of the tendencies of the development of constitutionalism in the XXI century.
An «Austrian» (continental) model for the protection of constitutionality and legality, based on G. Kelsen's theory. Constitutional issues under this model are considered and resolved by a separate specialized body called the Constitutional Court. The decisions made by these courts have the effect of erga omnes, whether it is a matter of preventive or repressive control of constitutionality. According to G. Kelsen, the Constitutional Court must act as a «negative legislator» who is empowered to repeal or suspend laws or parts thereof that do not comply with a supreme legal act. In Europe, this model of constitutional court organization was chosen by countries such as Andorra, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Macedonia, Germany (with 12 constitutional courts), Hungary, Ukraine, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, etc.
Third, specialized evolutionary constitutional courts have undergone several stages in their evolution, the last of which – the creation of constitutional courts in Eastern Europe after the democratic revolutions of the late 1980s-early 1990s - also covered Ukraine
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