The “Balance of Probability” Standard of Proof: a Theoretical and Legal Analysis

Abstract

The article conducts a comprehensive study of the legal nature of the “balance of probabilities” standard of proof, its historical evolution, doctrinal understanding, and areas of practical application in various branches of law. In particular, it examines the features of the formation and application of this standard in the systems of Anglo-Saxon and continental law, with an emphasis on civil, administrative, and quasi-criminal proceedings. A comparative legal analysis of the judicial practice of the United Kingdom, Canada, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Supreme Court of Ukraine is conducted, which allowed us to outline modern trends in the interpretation of the boundaries and content of this standard. It is argued that the “balance of probabilities” is not only a tool for distributing the burden of proof, but also an epistemological criterion for the validity of a judicial conviction, which ensures proper procedural balance between the parties. The article examines the controversial aspects related to the variability of standards within the framework of civil proceedings (for example, “convincing and clear evidence”) and their compatibility with the presumption of innocence in quasi-criminal procedures. As a result, the need to develop unified approaches to the application of the “balance of probabilities” standard as a guarantee of fairness, predictability and efficiency of judicial proceedings in a democratic legal order is substantiated.